

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6496

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03067

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-PLenary DISCUSSIONS,  
FEBRUARY 16, 1978 (SALT TWO - 1638)

1. (ROWNY/BELETSKY-USTINOV, A-2045)

NEW TYPES

BELETSKY OBSERVED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING SAID AT  
TODAY'S PLENARY WAS SEMENOV COMMENT FOLLOWING U.S. STATE-  
MENT. SOVIET SIDE HAD CLEARLY AND DEFINITELY PRESENTED  
ITS RATIONALE FOR "NEW TYPES" AND SEMENOV HAD RECONFIRMED  
THE SOVIET POSITION.

ASBMS

USTINOV SAID U.S. MEMBERS OF DRAFTING GROUP HAD BEEN UNABLE  
TO EXPLAIN INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN TREATY AND PROTOCOL  
REGARDING ASBMS AND ASKED FOR ELABORATION. BELETSKY SAID  
INCONSISTENCY ON U.S. SIDE WAS NOT MATTER OF FORM BUT OF  
SUBSTANCE. HE SAID U.S. STATEMENT CLAIMED THAT NEW TYPES  
OF ICBMS WOULD BE DESTABILIZING WHILE PROPOSALS ON ASBMS

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WOULD NOT BE. BELETSKY ARGUED THAT U.S. FOCUSED ON ONLY  
ONE SYSTEM -- FIXED ICBMS -- AND CLAIMED THAT THESE WERE  
THE ONLY DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS. HE SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS  
THAT U.S. WAS DOING THIS BECAUSE SOVIETS PLACED GREAT  
EMPHASIS ON ICBM FORCE WHILE U.S. PLACED RELIANCE ON TRIAD.  
BELETSKY ALSO ARGUED AGAINST PERMITTING MIRVED ASBMS,  
SAYING THAT IT WAS COMPOUNDING ONE INCONSISTENCY UPON

ANOTHER IF WE WERE TO MIRV A NEW TYPE OF SYSTEM.

2. (G. JOHNSON-FREW/SHCHUKIN, A-2048)

#### NEW TYPES

SHCHUKIN SAID U.S. STATEMENT HAD CREATED A VERY NEGATIVE IMPRESSION UPON HIM. SHCHUKIN SAID ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF U.S. STATEMENT, PERSONAL IMPRESSION WAS IT WOULD NOT BE EASIER BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, MORE DIFFICULT TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. SHCHUKIN SAID IT WAS HIS PURELY PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW THAT STATEMENT MADE BY U.S. SIDE TODAY WOULD BE OBSTACLE TO REACHING AGREEMENT BETWEEN SIDES. MOREOVER, ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY U.S. SIDE WERE IN COMPLETE CONTRADICTION WITH PAST U.S. PRACTICE AND WHAT WAS EVEN NOW AVAILABLE. SPECIFICALLY, HE WAS REFERRING TO LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. HE SAID HE HAD KNOWN U.S. POSITION FOR SOME TIME BUT HAD THOUGHT NEGOTIATIONS WERE FOR PURPOSE OF FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, NOT FOR REINFORCING BARRIERS BETWEEN SIDES. SHCHUKIN SAID IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF NEW TYPES OF ARMS TO WHICH U.S. SIDE ATTRIBUTED LESSER CAPABILITIES THAN TO ICBMS. EXAMPLES WERE LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILES AND ASBMS. SUCH DISTINCTION WAS NOT NATURAL. AT SAME TIME, U.S. SINGLED OUT ICBMS SPECIFICALLY, AND PROPOSED UNFOUNDED ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THEIR MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO SECRET

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WHAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY THE SIDES. SHCHUKIN SAID HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, AND THIS WAS FIRST TIME HE HEARD ANY SIDE QUESTION PRINCIPLE OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING ARMS. HE WAS DISTRESSED THAT WHILE USSR HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF NEW TYPE OF LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILE PROPOSED BY U.S., IN ANSWER U.S. NOW SPOKE OF RESTRICTIONS ON MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT, AND THIS WAS APART FROM QUESTION OF "NEW TYPES."

#### CRUISE MISSILES

REFERRING TO RANGE CAPABILITY, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT THE STRICTER THE DEFINITION THE BETTER IT WOULD BE. HE THEN REPEATED SEVERAL CRITICISMS OF U.S. DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WHICH ALLOWED CRUISE MISSILE TO HAVE ANY DESIRED RANGE DEPENDING ON NUMBER OF MANEUVERS IT WAS REQUIRED TO PERFORM ON THE WAY TO ITS TARGET. REGARDING TESTS OF SOVIET SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE ALLEGEDLY TESTED TO RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM, HE STATED HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH TESTS. IT SEEMED TO HIM JOHNSON'S INFORMATION WAS NOT ACCURATE. SHCHUKIN SAID RANGE DEFINITION

NEEDED TO BE UNAMBIGUOUS AND CLEAR. OF COURSE, DEFINITION THAT SOVIET SIDE OFFERED WAS ALSO NOT COMPLETELY STRICT BECAUSE VERTICAL MANEUVERS WOULD NOT AFFECT PROJECTION OF CRUISE MISSILE FLIGHT PATH ON EARTH'S SURFACE. HOWEVER, SOVIET DEFINITION TRIED TO INTRODUCE SUFFICIENT CLARITY BY SAYING MISSILE WOULD OPERATE IN ITS STANDARD DESIGN MODE. HE SAID RANGE WAS DETERMINED BY CAPABILITIES OF PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKING IN ITS OPERATIONAL MODE.

HEAVY BOMBERS/ASW AIRCRAFT

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 03067

EXDIS

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REFERRING TO SOVIET STATEMENT, SHCHUKIN SAID IT SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO ANY MILITARY SPECIALIST THAT THERE WAS GREAT DEGREE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOVIET ASW AIRCRAFT AND SOVIET HEAVY BOMBER. THEY HAD ONLY TWO QUALITIES IN COMMON: THEY COULD BOTH FLY AND THEY COULD BOTH DROP BOMBS. OTHERWISE EQUIPMENT WAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. ALSO, HE POINTED OUT THAT CONVERTING ASW AIRCRAFT TO HEAVY BOMBER OR VICE VERSA SEEMED MORE COMPLEX THAN BUILDING EITHER AIRCRAFT FROM GROUND UP, BECAUSE THEY WERE SO DIFFERENT INTERNALLY. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN SPEAKING OF RADOME, METHODS FOR FINDING SUBMARINES WHEN COMPARED TO METHODS FOR FINDING SURFACE TARGETS WERE VERY DIFFERENT AND AS A RESULT RADAR SYSTEMS WERE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. CHANGING RADAR WOULD MEAN CHANGING ENTIRE NOSE OR ENTIRE LOWER PART OF AIRCRAFT. THIS WAS EVIDENCED BY FACT THAT DESIGNATIONS FOR TU BOMBER AND ASW AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DIFFERENT EVEN BEFORE THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEGUN. SHCHUKIN DID NOT THINK THAT SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE PUT INTO DIFFICULT POSITION BECAUSE IT HAD

MADE FORTUNATE TECHNICAL DECISION WHICH HAD ALLOWED FOR CERTAIN DEGREE OF STANDARDIZATION. THIS WOULD BE UNJUST. SHCHUKIN SAID RADAR WAS DIFFERENT AND THERE WERE OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES. ALSO, HE WAS CERTAIN U.S. NTM  
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WAS VERY WELL AWARE THAT TU-142, WHICH HAD BEEN USED IN EXERCISES QUITE OFTEN, HAD NEVER BEEN USED TO ATTACK SURFACE TARGETS AND TU-95 HAD NEVER BEEN USED IN ANTI-SUBMARINE ROLE.

3. (PEREZ-MCNEILL/SMOLIN, A-2049)

CRUISE MISSILES

SMOLIN STATED THAT U.S. CRUISE MISSILE DEFINITION PROPOSAL COULD BE READ IN TWO DIFFERENT WAYS. FIRST READING WOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THINGS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE CRUISE MISSILES AND "PILOTLESS AIRPLANES" USED FOR RECONNAISSANCE, SUCH AS THOSE DEVELOPED AFTER THE "POWERS INCIDENT." IF THIS WAS CORRECT READING OF U.S. POSITION, SMOLIN FORESAW NO PROBLEM WITH DRAFTING DEFINITION FOR CRUISE MISSILES WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE SUCH "PILOTLESS AIRPLANES." HOWEVER, SECOND POSSIBLE READING WOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CRUISE MISSILES WHICH WERE WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLES AND OTHER CRUISE MISSILES OF SAME TYPE WHICH WERE NOT ARMED. IF THIS READING WAS CORRECT, AS SOME MEMBERS OF USSR DELEGATION SUSPECTED, SMOLIN FORESAW EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS AND DIFFICULTIES. HE SAID USSR COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESPOND TO SUCH POSITION AS IT HAD TO U.S. PROPOSAL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN NUCLEAR-ARMED AND CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED CRUISE MISSILES. ELABORATING ON "PILOTLESS AIRPLANES," SMOLIN SAID WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WERE AIRPLANES THAT OPERATED AT HIGH ALTITUDE WITHOUT PILOT ABOARD FOR PURPOSE OF TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS THROUGH WIDE-ANGLE-LENS CAMERAS. THESE DEVICES WERE VERY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT PRESS REFERRED TO AS CRUISE MISSILES. EARLE

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